归纳问题的再审视——从戴维·多伊奇与归纳主义的辩驳看
Reassessment of the Inductive Problem —From the Refutation of David Deutsch and Inductionism
DOI: 10.12677/ACPP.2023.121055, PDF,    国家社会科学基金支持
作者: 陈廷煊, 王 皓, 张洪雷:南京中医药大学马克思主义学院·医学人文学院,江苏 南京
关键词: 波普尔归纳问题归纳怀疑主义归纳原则自然齐一律Popper Inductive Problem Inductive Skepticism Principle of Induction Principle of Uniformity of Nature
摘要: 波普尔认为自己解决了归纳问题,但是许多哲学家并不承认。戴维·多伊奇在《真实世界的脉络》中宣称波普尔解决了归纳问题。本文基于多伊奇的文本分析多伊奇与隐归纳主义者辩论的文本,梳理归纳主义与波普尔主义者在不同问题上的立场,尝试总结多伊奇反归纳主义的实质要点,完善多伊奇所提及的波普尔科学方法论的完整命题表述。归纳问题在分析意义上无法证明,波普尔主义与传统归纳主义之争焦点在于“是否存在逻辑上完备的证明”及其背后的认识论背景。
Abstract: Popper thought he had solved the problem of induction, but many philosophers denied it. In the book The Fabric of Reality, David Deutsch claims that Popper had solved the problem. This paper will clarify the rationality of the modern form of the “problem of induction problem” and analysis the text of “David and the Crypto-inductivist”, to summarize the different standpoints of inductivists and popperians, trying to summarize the complete statement of popper’s scientific methodology. The problem of induction cannot be proved in the analytical sense. The dispute between Popper’s doctrine and traditional inductive doctrine lies in “whether there is logically complete proof” and the epistemological background behind them.
文章引用:陈廷煊, 王皓, 张洪雷. 归纳问题的再审视——从戴维·多伊奇与归纳主义的辩驳看[J]. 哲学进展, 2023, 12(1): 309-315. https://doi.org/10.12677/ACPP.2023.121055

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