梅洛–庞蒂本己身体观对笛卡尔身心二元论的超越
The Transcendence of Merleau-Ponty’s Self-Body View over Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism
摘要: 对身体问题的探讨由来已久,是哲学史上热议的重要话题之一。在笛卡尔那里身体和心灵作为两种不同的实体而相互独立、彼此分离,但现实生活中发生的身心相互影响的现象无法解释,进而陷入困境。后世的哲学家试图从不同的方面提出关于身体的理论试图走出这个困境,梅洛–庞蒂也从现象学的背景给出一个灵肉合一的身体,并通过“身体图式”和“身体意向性”对这样一个灵肉合一的本己身体进一步充实和说明,使本己身体更加立体化,正是梅洛–庞蒂对鲜活身体的揭示克服了笛卡尔机械论身体观进而实现对身心二元论的超越。
Abstract:
The discussion of physical problems has a long history and is one of the hot topics in the history of philosophy. In Descartes, the body and mind are independent and separated from each other as two different entities, but the phenomenon that the body and mind interact with each other in real life can’t be explained, and then they get into trouble. Later philosophers tried to put forward the theory of body from different aspects and try to get out of this predicament. Merleau-Ponty also gave a body with the unity of soul and body from the background of phenomenology, and further enriched and explained such a body with the unity of soul and body through “body schema” and “body intentionality”, which made the body more three-dimensional, and at the same time realized the transcendence of Descartes’ dualism of body and mind.
参考文献
|
[1]
|
笛卡尔. 第一哲学沉思集[M]. 庞景仁, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1986: 26, 85, 88, 141.
|
|
[2]
|
杨大春. 语言、身体、他者——当代法国哲学的三大主题[M]. 北京: 生活·读书·新知三联书店, 2007: 130.
|
|
[3]
|
黑格尔. 哲学史讲演录:第四卷[M]. 贺麟, 等, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1982: 230.
|
|
[4]
|
梅洛-庞蒂. 知觉现象学[M]. 杨大春, 张尧均, 关群德, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2021: 111-112, 123-124, 133, 144, 148, 204-205.
|
|
[5]
|
刘胜利. 身体、空间与科学——梅洛-庞蒂的空间现象学研究[M]. 南京: 江苏人民出版社, 2014: 179.
|
|
[6]
|
宁晓萌. 表达与存在——梅洛-庞蒂现象学研究[M]. 北京: 北京出版社, 2013: 73.
|
|
[7]
|
杨大春. 20世纪法国哲学的现象学之旅[M]. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2014: 278.
|
|
[8]
|
费多益. 寓身认知理论的循证研究[J]. 科学技术哲学研究, 2010(1): 19.
|