平台型企业的管理控制研究——基于委托代理理论的视角

Research on Management Control of Platform Enterprises—Based on the Perspective of Principal-Agent Theory

摘要: 随着互联网的发展，信息的重要性越来越得到凸显，共享经济再次被大家提起和认知，由此也衍生出了平台型企业。平台型企业的管理是十分复杂的，而委托代理理论的应用可以解决平台型企业的管理问题。本文基于委托代理理论分析研究平台型企业的管理控制问题，探究在大数据时代背景下平台型企业可能出现控制问题的原因，即信息不对称，委托人和代理人效用函数的不同，二者承担风险的不同，隧道视野效应。并据此提出优化建议及措施，具体为：1) 建立完善的管理控制制度。2) 提升激励水平，建立“激励相融”机制。3) 优化信息系统，加强沟通。4) 强化内控监督机制。

Abstract: With the development of the Internet, the importance of information has become increasingly prominent, and the sharing economy has been mentioned and recognized again, which has also led to platform enterprises. The management of platform enterprises is very complex, and the applica-tion of principal-agent theory can solve the management problems of platform enterprises. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes and studies the management control problems of platform enterprises, and explores the reasons why platform enterprises may have control prob-lems in the context of the big data era, namely, information asymmetry, the difference between the utility functions of the principal and the agent, the difference in their risk taking, and the tunnel vi-sion effect. Based on this, optimization suggestions and measures are proposed, specifically: 1) Es-tablishing a sound management control system. 2) Improving the incentive level and establishing a mechanism of “incentive integration”. 3) Optimizing the information system and strengthening communication. 4) Strengthening the internal control and supervision mechanism.