政府奖惩下双渠道供应链减排时滞微分博弈研究

Time Lag Differential Game Study of Two-Channel Supply Chain Emission Reduction under Premium and Penalty of Government

摘要: 基于政府奖惩针对单制造商、单供应商和单零售商组成的三级供应链，考虑技术与宣传的多时滞效应以及消费者线上渠道偏好，建立两种奖惩机制结合两种双渠道结构的四类模型，利用微分博弈理论和连续型动态规划理论得到不同模型的减排决策以及最优利润，并结合算例对模型进行对比分析以及关键参数敏感性分析。研究发现，时滞存在阈值，只有低于阈值时利润才会随时滞延长而提高，政府奖惩力度和消费者渠道偏好都会因所处不同时滞期而对收益产生不同的影响，因此政府和企业做决策时要综合考虑滞后期以及市场环境，进行动态调整和及时优化。不仅如此，时滞较短时政府只奖惩供应商和制造商且制造商开辟线上渠道情形下供应链减排量、低碳商誉水平以及利润都相对较高。

Abstract: Based on the three-level supply chain composed of a single manufacturer, a single supplier, and a single retailer with premium and penalty of government, considering the multi-lag effect of technology and publicity as well as the preference of consumers’ online channel, four models of two reward-penalty mechanisms combined with two dual-channel structures are established. The differential game theory and continuous dynamic programming theory are used to obtain the emission reduction decisions and the optimal profits of different models, the comparative analysis of the models and sensitivity analysis of key parameters are also carried out with the examples. The study found that there is a threshold for the time lag. Only below the threshold, the profit will increase with the extension of the time lag. The government’s reward and punishment intensity and consumer channel preference will have different effects on the income due to different time lag periods. Therefore, the government and enterprises should comprehensively consider the lag period and the market environment when making decisions, and make dynamic adjustments and timely optimization. Moreover, when the time lag is short, the government only rewards and punishes suppliers and manufacturers and manufacturers open up online channels, the supply chain emission reduction, low-carbon goodwill level, and profit are relatively high.