集体风险困境的研究进展与应用综述
A Review on the Research Progress and Application of Collective Risk Dilemma
DOI: 10.12677/AP.2023.136313, PDF,   
作者: 陈鸿窈：浙江理工大学心理学系，浙江 杭州
关键词: 集体风险；社会困境；合作；行为决策；Collective Risk； Social Dilemma； Cooperation； Decision-Making
摘要: 集体风险困境作为社会困境的一种变体，可以更确切地描述许多当代社会挑战，比如气候变化和传染病的传播等问题，人们在该情境下需要共同合作以避免集体性的灾难。集体风险困境的研究与全球人民的福祉息息相关。研究得到的理论成果和实证证据，有利于人们全面理解集体风险下的行为决策并提出解决措施。目前该领域的研究结论较为分散，因此本文对集体风险困境进行了概念梳理，并对已有研究结论进行回顾和归纳，在此基础上展望未来的研究，为后续的研究提供参考方向。
Abstract: The collective risk dilemma, as a variant of social dilemma, can accurately describe many con-temporary social challenges such as climate change and the spread of infectious diseases. In this context, people need to cooperate to avoid collective disasters. The study of collective risk dilemma is closely related to the well-being of global citizens. The theoretical achievements and empirical evidence obtained from this research are conducive to a comprehensive understanding of the actions under collective risk and proposing solutions. Currently, the conclusions in this field are relatively scattered. Therefore, this article summarizes the concept of collective risk dilemma, reviews and summarizes research conclusions, and looks forward to future research to provide reference for subsequent studies.
文章引用：陈鸿窈 (2023). 集体风险困境的研究进展与应用综述. 心理学进展, 13(6), 2537-2545. https://doi.org/10.12677/AP.2023.136313

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