我国高端钟表售后市场垄断化的反竞争效应研究
Research on Anti-Competition Effect of Monopoly of Market of High-End Clock and Clock in Our Country
摘要: 我国钟表行业以进口为主,进口钟表尤其是高端钟表是拉动国内高端消费的驱动力。高端钟表制造商实施以转售价格维持为核心的售后市场垄断化手段,导致了中国高端钟表市场超高的零整比。本文对典型售后市场垄断模型加以扩展,将品牌钟表制造商在销售市场实行单一转售价格维持与其在销售、售后市场实行双重转售价格维持的均衡结果进行了比较,进一步探究了我国高端钟表售后市场垄断化的反竞争效应。高端品牌钟表制造商利用双重转售价格维持,能获得更多的纵向一体化利润,但严重损害了消费者福利和社会总福利,且其垄断势力将随着消费者消费能力的提高而愈发严重,最终将阻碍中国高端钟表市场的健康发展。钟表行业的反垄断问题研究在我国尚属空白领域,本文对我国高端钟表售后市场垄断行为进行了量化分析,填补了国内高端钟表售后市场垄断化的反竞争效应研究的缺口,也为完善相关反垄断政策的制定提供新视角和理论借鉴。
Abstract:
Our country watch industry is mainly imported watch and clock; especially high-end watch is the driving force of high-end consumption. High-end watch manufacturers implement the after-sale market monopoly with resale price maintenance as the core, resulting in the super high zero- integration ratio of China’s high-end watch market. This article expanded the model of typical after-sales market monopoly. Compared the equilibrium result of the brand clock manufacturer’s single resale price maintenance in the sale market with its double resale price maintenance in the sale and after-sales market, the anti-competition effect of monopoly of high-end clock and clock in our country was further explored. High-end brand watch manufacturers can obtain more vertical integration profits by using dual resale price maintenance, but it seriously damages consumer welfare and total social welfare, and its monopoly power will become more and more serious with the improvement of consumer consumption power, which will eventually hinder the healthy development of China’s high-end watch market. Research on anti-monopoly of watch and clock industry is still blank in our country. This paper quantifies the monopoly behavior of high-end watch and clock, fills the gap of anti-competition effect.
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