论海德格尔对胡塞尔先验自我的批判与超越

On Heidegger’s Critique and Transcendence of Husserl’s Transcendental Self

摘要: “自我”是哲学的重要内容，从古希腊开始，哲人们已萌发对“自我”的探讨。近代以来，笛卡尔的“我思故我在”确定了人类一切认识的自明性的原始基础，即具有绝对确定性的“自我”(ego)，康德的“人为自然立法”正式确立了人的主体性原则，但近代哲学家对主体的阐述是在主客二分的框架下进行的。现象学之父胡塞尔力图打破主客二分的框架，从现象学角度提出了通过现象学还原达到“先验自我”的思想，突出“先验自我”的自我明证性和普遍性，但其先验自我概念仍是以“主体”这一概念为基础进行的建构。其学生海德格尔不满其将“自我”这一概念套在“主体”这一框架下，海德格尔试图从存在哲学的角度，通过强调“此在”的未完成性和可能性，批判胡塞尔的先验自我，力图达到超越“主体”这一概念的目的。

Abstract: “Self” is an important content of philosophy, and since ancient Greece, philosophers have sprouted discussions on “self”. Since modern times, Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” has established the original basis for the self illumination of all human knowledge, that is, the “ego” with absolute certainty. Kant’s “legislation for human nature” has officially established the principle of human subjectivity, but modern philosophers’ interpretation of the subject is carried out within the framework of the separation of subject and object. Husserl, the father of phenomenology, tried to break the dichotomy of subject and object, put forward the idea of achieving “transcendental self” through phenomenology reduction from the perspective of phenomenology, highlighting the self demonstration and universality of “transcendental self”, but his transcendental self-concept was still constructed based on the concept of “subject”. His student Heidegger was dissatisfied with applying the concept of “self” within the framework of “subject”. Heidegger attempted to transcend the concept of “subject” from the perspective of existential philosophy. By emphasizing the incompleteness and possibility of “this being” and criticizing Husserl’s transcendental self, we aim to transcend the concept of “subject”.