论胡塞尔“动感理论”与梅洛–庞蒂“知觉理论”的比较分析
On Husserl’s “Dynamic Theory” and Merleau-Ponty’s “Theory of Perception”
摘要: 胡塞尔动感理论和梅洛–庞蒂的知觉理论的共同出发点都是探讨“人类是如何认识世界的”问题,但梅洛–庞蒂“知觉理论”一直被看作是对胡塞尔的“动感理论”的批判,二者之间的根本差异在于:前者是生存论意义上的现象学,后者则是纯粹的知识论意义上的现象学。
Abstract:
The common starting point of Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception is to explore the question of “how humans perceive the world.” However, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception has been regarded as a critique of Husserl’s phenomenology of perception. The fundamental difference between the two lies in the fact that the former is a phenomenology in the sense of existentialism, while the latter is purely a phenomenology in the sense of epistemology.
参考文献
|
[1]
|
比梅尔. 纯粹现象学与现象学哲学的观念(第2卷) [M]//胡塞尔. 胡塞尔全集(第4卷). 海牙: 马尔梯努斯∙奈伊霍夫出版社, 1952: 150.
|
|
[2]
|
施特拉塞尔. 笛卡尔是的沉思与巴黎讲演[M]//胡塞尔. 胡塞尔全集(第1卷). 海牙: 马尔梯努斯∙奈伊霍夫出版社, 1952: 78.
|
|
[3]
|
胡塞尔. 伦理学与价值论的基本问题[M]. 艾四林, 安仕侗, 译. 北京: 中国城市出版社, 2002: 134.
|
|
[4]
|
梅洛-庞蒂. 知觉现象学[M]. 姜志辉, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2001: 24+135.
|