重评布伦塔诺的“表象论”——基于《从经验立场的心理学》

Reevaluating Brentano’s “Theory of Representation”—Based on “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint”

摘要: 本文基于《从经验立场出发的心理学》一书阐释布伦塔诺的“表象论”立场，在布氏看来“表象”是一切认识活动的基础，任何事物均通过“表象”的形式呈现于意识之中。而布氏的独特贡献在于其区分出了表象的双重向度：一、指向外部物理世界(映像)，二、指向内部心理活动自身(内表象)；前者强调表象一词的名词用法，即“表象内容”，布氏称之为“物理现象”，后者则强调表象一词的动词用法，即“表象活动”本身，布氏称之为“心理现象”。但需要强调的是，在布氏看来，不论物理现象还是心理现象，均以呈现在意识之中为前提，这是布伦塔诺的表象论的关键所在。因为在布氏看来，凡呈现在表象之中的，便意味着呈现于意识之中，没有离开意识而孤立存在的“物理现象”。

Abstract: This article explores Brentano’s “Theory of Representation” based on his book “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint”. According to Brentano, “representation” is the foundation of all cognitive activities, and all things are presented in consciousness in the form of “representations”. Brentano’s unique contribution lies in his distinction of the dual aspects of representation: the outward-directed aspect towards the external physical world (image), and the inward-directed aspect towards internal mental activity itself (inner representation). The former emphasizes the noun usage of the term “representation”, referring to the “content of representation” or “physical phenomena”, while the latter emphasizes the verb usage, referring to the “activity of representation” or “mental phenomena”. However, it is important to note that, according to Brentano, both physical and mental phenomena are premised on being presented in consciousness. This is the key aspect of Brentano’s theory of representation, as, in his view, anything presented in representation implies being presented in consciousness, and there are no “physical phenomena” that exist independently outside of consciousness.