股东代表诉讼制度中小股东利益保护的困境及其突破

The Dilemma and Breakthrough of the Interest Protection of Minority Shareholders in the Shareholder Representative Litigation System

摘要: 我国立法规定股东代表诉讼制度的股东间接享受公司胜诉利益，且对原告缺乏主观心理状态的评价；司法实践中呈现股东提起诉讼少，维权积极性低的现象，导致股东代表诉讼制度欠缺对中小股东利益的保障，在具体适用中存在适用少、难胜诉的困境。目前主要有针对原告适格标准和前置程序两方面的措施，前者通过股份持有规则、持有期间规则和持股比例、持股期间双重限制规则加以完善，后者通过商业判断规则和效力阻却说进行优化。但是在实践适用中难以确定持有股份比例和时间具体适用标准，可操作性较低；前置程序条件优化但难应对各种案件。股东代表诉讼制度在未来的发展中可以引入无因管理制度，在经济层面通过管理人的相关规定来扩大股东权利，赋予其求偿请求权；同时引入主观心理状态的评价机制，在制度设计中均衡中小股东利益和防范恶意诉讼，激励股东积极通过诉讼的方式保障中小股东利益，改善公司运营和维护市场经济环境。

Abstract: Chinese legislation stipulates that the shareholders in the litigation system indirectly enjoy the benefits of the company, and lack the evaluation of the subjective psychological state of the plaintiff; in judicial practice, the shareholders have less lawsuits and low enthusiasm for rights protection, resulting in the lack of protection of the interests of minority shareholders, and the difficulties in the specific application. At present, there are mainly measures for the plaintiff’s suitability standard and pre-procedure. The former is improved through the share holding rules, the holding period rules and shareholding ratio, and the holding period, while the latter is optimized through business judgment rules and effectiveness resistance. However, it is difficult to determine the proportion and time, which has low operability; pre-procedure conditions are optimized but it is difficult to deal with various cases. In the future development of the shareholder representative litigation system, expand shareholder rights and grant the right of claim, introduce the evaluation mechanism of subjective psychological state to balance the interests of minority shareholders and prevent malicious litigation, encourage shareholders to actively protect the interests of minority shareholders through litigation, improve the company operation and maintain the market economic environ-ment.