企业金融化、高管薪酬与创新绩效

Corporate Financialization, Executive Compensation and Innovation Performance

摘要: 近年来，我国实体经济面临过度金融化的风险。本文以中国A股市场2009~2022年非金融企业为样本，研究企业金融化对企业创新绩效产生怎样的影响。通过实证发现，企业金融投资活动对企业创新绩效具有负效应。进一步考虑公司高管薪酬的调节作用发现：高管货币薪酬激励发挥着负向调节作用；高管股权激励发挥着正向调节作用。本文研究了金融化与创新绩效的关系，同时从公司治理角度考虑了高管薪酬的调节效应，对于当前如何从高管薪酬角度缓解金融化对创新的负面效应具有一定的启示意义。

Abstract: In recent years, China’s real economy has faced the risk of excessive financialization. This paper takes non-financial enterprises in China’s A-share market from 2009 to 2022 as a sample to study the impact of corporate financialization on corporate innovation performance. Through the empirical study, it is found that corporate financial investment has a negative effect on corporate innovation performance. Further consideration of the moderating effect of executive compensation shows that: executive monetary compensation incentive plays a negative moderating effect; and Executive equity incentive plays a positive regulating role. This paper studies the relationship between financialization and innovation performance, and considers the moderating effect of executive compensation from the perspective of corporate governance, which has certain implications for how to mitigate the negative effect of financialization on innovation from the perspective of executive com-pensation.