互联网平台自我优待的反垄断规制

Anti Monopoly Regulation for Self Preferential Treatment of Internet Platforms

摘要: 自谷歌比价购物一案以来，互联网平台实施的自我优待行为在反垄断领域引起了广泛讨论。平台凭借其强大的市场地位，利用杠杆效应，对自家产品或服务实行自我优待，形成平台包抄局面。自我优待的滥用会对市场竞争秩序、产品创新和改良、消费者福利造成损害，甚至可能引发双轮垄断的风险。平台经济的新兴特征使得传统反垄断分析范式在规制自我优待行为上不敷适用。为此，借鉴域外经验，对平台进行分类分级施加禁止自我优待的义务不失为一种有效的规制方法，同时辅之以平台企业的自主合规和算法透明制度的完善，可以对平台自我优待有效规制。

Abstract: Since the Google comparison shopping case, the self-preferential behavior implemented by Internet platforms has aroused widespread discussion in the field of antitrust. By virtue of its strong market position, the platform uses the leverage effect to implement self-preferential treatment for its own products or services, forming a platform outflanking situation. The abuse of self-preference will cause damage to market competition order, product innovation and improvement, and consumer welfare, and may even lead to the risk of double monopoly. The emerging characteristics of the platform economy make the traditional antitrust analysis paradigm inadequate in regulating self-preferential behavior. Therefore, learning from foreign experience, imposing the obligation of prohibiting self-preferential treatment on the classification and grading of platforms is an effective regulatory method, and at the same time, supplemented by the improvement of platform enterprises’ autonomous compliance and algorithm transparency system, it can effectively regulate platform self-preferential treatment.