审计师声誉与IPO估值泡沫

Auditor Reputation and IPO Valuation Bubble

摘要: 审计作为提高上市公司信息披露质量的制度安排，具有合理保证公司财务报表真实性的功能。那么，高声誉审计师能否促进新股定价效率提升，降低一级市场的IPO估值泡沫呢？本文选取了2010~2019年A股市场2019家IPO上市公司作为研究对象，使用剩余收益估价模型对新股内在价值进行估值，进而计算泡沫，实证检验审计师声誉与IPO估值泡沫之间的关系。研究发现，我国A股市场存在IPO估值泡沫，且审计师声誉越高，IPO估值泡沫越小。文章的研究拓展了现有文献，从一级市场的角度验证了泡沫的产生和影响因素，对于投资者优化投资决策和政府提高新股定价效率具有启发意义。

Abstract: As an institutional arrangement to improve the quality of information released by listed companies, the audit has the function of reasonably ensuring the authenticity of the company’s financial statements. So, can reputable auditors improve the efficiency of new share pricing and reduce the IPO valuation bubble in the primary market? This paper selects 2019 IPO-listed companies in the A-stock market from 2010 to 2019, uses the residual earnings valuation method to estimate the intrinsic value of new shares, and then calculates the bubble, and empirically tests the relationship between auditor reputation and IPO valuation bubble. The results show that the IPO valuation bubble exists in China’s A-stock market, and the higher the auditor’s reputation, the smaller the IPO valuation bubble. The research expands the existing literature, and verifies the formation and influencing factors of bubbles from the perspective of the primary market, which has enlightening significance for investors to optimize investment decisions and the government to improve the efficiency of IPO pricing.