考虑零售商引入自有品牌的信息共享策略

Consider Information Sharing Strategies for Retailers Introducing Store Brand

摘要: 在激烈的市场竞争中，零售商可能通过建立自有品牌直接进军供应链上游，与制造商展开竞争。而在市场需求不稳定的行业，制造商可能会比零售商更了解市场需求。首先构建了制造商是否共享信息和零售商是否引入自有品牌的四种策略组合，然后分析制造商基于零售商引入行为的信息共享策略以及受引入成本和品牌优势的影响。研究发现，零售商的最优引入决策不仅取决于引入成本的高低，还受制造商品牌优势的影响。当品牌优势过高时，零售商没有动机引入自有品牌销售。而当品牌优势较低时，零售商Ri有引入自有品牌的意愿，但实际是否引入取决于引入成本的大小。

Abstract: In highly competitive markets, retailers may be able to compete with manufacturers by establishing their own brands and moving directly up the supply chain. And in industries with unstable market demand, manufacturers may know the market demand better than retailers. Four strategy combinations of whether manufacturers share information and whether retailers introduce private labels are first constructed, and then manufacturers’ information sharing strategies based on retailers’ introduction behaviors and influenced by introduction costs and brand advantages are analyzed. It is found that the retailer’s optimal introduction decision not only depends on the level of introduction cost I, but is also influenced by the manufacturer’s brand dominance. When brand dominance is too high, retailers have no incentive to introduce private label sales. Whereas when brand dominance is low, Ri has the intention to introduce private label, but the actual introduction depends on the size of the introduction cost.