论国有资本控股公司中非国有资本投资者的权益保护
On the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Non-State-Owned Capital Investors in State-Owned Capital Holding Companies
摘要: 目前,国有资本控股公司的组织机构主要依据《企业国有资产法》的规定进行设置,《企业国有资产法》中关于股东会、董事会、监事会等组织机构的规定缺乏对非国有资本投资者权利的保护,以至于非国有资本投资者不敢投资国有公司,最终导致混合所有制改革没有起到预期的作用。对比之下,《公司法》对中小股东的权益保护相对较为全面和可行。因此笔者将通过对比《企业国有资产法》和《公司法(修订草案三次审议稿)征求意见》中对国有资本控股公司的股东会、董事会、监事会等组织机构的规定,得出国有资本控股公司应当借鉴非国有资本公司的组织机构的设置,在股东会、董事会、监事会的职权分配中加强对非国有资本投资者的权益保护,激发非国有资本投资者的积极性和参与感,激活国企混合所有制改革。
Abstract:
At present, the organizational structure of state-owned capital holding companies is mainly set up according to the provisions of the Enterprise State-Owned Assets Law. The provisions of the Enterprise State-Owned Assets Law on the shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors, the Board of supervisors and other organizational bodies lack protection for the rights of non-state-owned capital investors, so that non-state-owned capital investors dare not invest in state-owned companies. In the end, the mixed ownership reform did not play the expected role. In contrast, the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders in the Company Law is relatively comprehensive and feasible. Therefore, the author will draw the conclusion that state-owned capital holding com-panies should learn from the organizational structure of non-state-owned capital companies by comparing the provisions of the Enterprise State-owned Assets Law and the Company Law (Third Review Draft of the Revised Draft) for the shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, Board of supervisors and other organizational structures. Strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of non-state capital investors in the allocation of powers and powers of the shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors and the board of supervisors, stimulate the enthusiasm and sense of participation of non-state capital investors, and activate the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.
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