电商巨头双重股权结构治理效应研究——以京东集团为例

Study on the Governance Effect of Dual-Class Shareholding Structure of E-Commerce Giants—Taking Jingdong Group as an Example

摘要: 股权结构组成是公司成立之初首先考虑的重中之重，在公司运营发展中也起着指导性的作用。我国目前允许的同股同权结构，在企业进行融资时不可避免的会导致股权稀释问题，进而产生创始人失去绝对表决权的场面。而双重股权结构可以在多轮融资的情况下，创始人依然掌握绝对的表决权，从而达到控制公司董事会和日常运营决策的目的。但同时也扭曲了控股股东的利润创造动机并且增加了代理成本和融资成本，应该加强对小股东的利益保护，对大股东进行有效规范，对关联交易进行重点披露与监管。本文采用案例研究法，以国内京东集团所采用的双重股权结构进行案例分析，探究该股权结构对公司效益的影响，为今后其他企业推行双重股权结构提供借鉴经验。

Abstract: The composition of equity structure is the most important thing to consider at the beginning of a company’s establishment, and it also plays a guiding role in the company’s operation and development. At present, the structure of equal shares and equal rights allowed in China will inevitably lead to the problem of equity dilution when enterprises carry out financing, and then produce the scene of founders losing absolute voting rights. In the case of multiple rounds of financing, the founders still have absolute voting rights, so as to achieve the purpose of controlling the company’s board of directors and daily operational decisions. However, it also distorts the profit creation motive of controlling shareholders and increases agency costs and financing costs. It is necessary to strengthen the protection of minority shareholders’ interests, effectively regulate major shareholders, and focus on disclosure and supervision of related party transactions. This paper adopts the case study method and analyzes the dual-class share structure adopted by Jingdong Group in China to explore the impact of the shareholding structure on the company’s efficiency, so as to provide reference experience for other enterprises to implement dual-class share structure in the future.