论贝叶斯主观概率解悖方案
Research on Bayesian Subjective Probability Solution to Paradoxes
摘要: 悖论问题一直是逻辑哲学的一个重要研究领域，自亚里士多德以来众多伟大哲学家对悖论问题提出了自己的创新见解，但诸多解悖方案均存在着其自身的不足，无法达到学术界统一的共识。近年来，一些贝叶斯主义的学者主张利用贝叶斯主观概率为悖论的解决提供新的思路。主观概率指利用理性对事物的信任程度进行量化，重新考虑悖论的本质并对悖论各个部分进行数字量化，最终提出关于贝叶斯主观概率思想的六个悖论解决方法。
Abstract: Paradox has always been an important research field in philosophy of logic. Since Aristotle, many great philosophers have put forward their own innovative opinions on paradox. However, many so-lutions to paradoxes have their own shortcomings and cannot reach a unified consensus in academ-ia. In recent years, some Bayesianism scholars advocate using Bayes subjective probability to pro-vide a new way to solve the paradox. Subjective probability refers to quantifying the degree of trust in things by reason, reconsidering the nature of paradox and quantifying each part of paradox digi-tally, and finally putting forward six solutions to the paradox of Bayes subjective probability thought.
文章引用：孙晶. 论贝叶斯主观概率解悖方案[J]. 哲学进展, 2024, 13(3): 438-447. https://doi.org/10.12677/ACPP.2024.133066

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