政府引导机制下科创共同体联合攻关三方演化博弈及仿真分析

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Science and Innovation Community Joint Research under the Government’s Guiding Mechanism

摘要: 科技创新一直以来都是国家和全社会关注的热点问题。近年来各个行业和各级政府都在加大科创投入和鼓励科创共同体的形成，以寻求通过联合攻关突破技术瓶颈和解决“卡脖子”问题。但科创共同体同时也存在缺乏系统性合作方案、科创激励政策互通性不足、绩效评价缺乏连续性等问题。本文基于效用理论，构建科创企业、高校研究院所和政府之间的三方演化博弈模型，通过分析各参与方策略选择的演化稳定性，深入探索各要素对三方策略选择的影响关系，并对博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性进行了进一步的探讨。研究结果表明：1) 政府增强奖励和惩罚力度，科创企业和高校研究院所更有可能积极参与科创共同体，但是过度增加奖励力度可能影响政府监管职责的履行；2) 为确保科创共同体的合作在演化稳定的市场环境下进行，政府需设定合理的奖惩机制，确保各方的奖惩之和大于各方单独创新收益；3) 在政府监管力度较弱时，无论政府选择何种策略，科创企业和高校研究院所的策略组合均趋向于不参与科创共同体的合作。最后，通过仿真分析论证所建模型的有效性，并为政府引导和优化科创共同体联合攻关的奖惩机制提供可行的对策与建议。

Abstract: Technological innovation has consistently been a focal point for both nations and society as a whole. In recent years, various industries and government levels have intensified efforts to boost investment in scientific and technological innovation (Sci-Tech), fostering the formation of Sci-Tech communities to collectively overcome technological bottlenecks and address critical challenges. However, Sci-Tech communities often face issues such as a lack of systematic collaboration schemes, insufficient interoperability of incentive policies, and a dearth of continuous performance evaluation. This paper, grounded in utility theory, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving Sci-Tech enterprises, university research institutions, and the government. By analyzing the evolutionary stability of strategies chosen by each participant, the study delves into the intricate relationships influencing the strategic choices of all stakeholders. Furthermore, the paper explores the stability of equilibrium points within the game system. Key findings include: 1) Strengthening government incentives and penalties increases the likelihood of active participation from Sci-Tech enterprises and university research institutions in Sci-Tech communities. However, an excessive emphasis on incentives may impact the government’s fulfillment of regulatory responsibilities. 2) To ensure the cooperation within Sci-Tech communities evolves in a stable market environment, the government must establish a judicious system of rewards and penalties, ensuring that the aggregate of incentives and penalties exceeds the individual innovation benefits of each party. 3) In instances of weak government regulatory oversight, regardless of the government’s chosen strategy, the strategic combination of Sci-Tech enterprises and university research institutions tends toward non-participation in Sci-Tech community collaboration. Finally, through simulation analysis, the paper validates the effectiveness of the proposed model and provides practical strategies and recommendations for the government to guide and optimize incentive mechanisms for collaborative Sci-Tech initiatives.