战略差异度、会计信息透明度与审计收费
Strategic Differentiation, Accounting Information Transparency and Audit Fees
DOI: 10.12677/orf.2024.142136, PDF,   
作者: 徐亦飞：上海工程技术大学管理学院，上海
关键词: 战略差异度；审计收费；会计信息透明度；Strategic Differentiation； Audit Fees； R & D Investment
摘要: 本文以2010~2022年我国A股上市公司的面板数据作为研究样本，构建个体固定效应模型实证分析了企业战略差异度、会计信息透明度与审计收费三者之间的作用渠道效果，还分析了影响效果是否存在所有制差异和审计规模差异，并进一步分析了在不同所有制和不同会计事务所下战略差异度对审计收费的影响效果。分析结果表明，战略差异越高审计收费就越高，即战略差异与审计收费显著正相关。在战略差异度对审计收费的影响过程中，会计信息透明度起到了部分中介作用。非国有制企业和非四大会计事务所审计企业的战略差异度对审计收费的影响更为显著。
Abstract: This study utilizes panel data from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning the years 2010 to 2022 as its research sample. Employing an individual fixed-effects model, the research empirically analyzes the interaction channels and effects between corporate strategic divergence, accounting transparency, and audit fees. The study further investigates whether these effects vary with differences in ownership structure and audit firm size. Additionally, it explores the impact of strategic divergence on audit fees in different ownership structures and with various audit firms. The findings indicate a positive and significant correlation between higher strategic divergence and increased audit fees. Accounting transparency plays a partial mediating role in the impact process of strategic divergence on audit fees. The influence of strategic divergence on audit fees is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and companies audited by non-Big four accounting firms.
文章引用：徐亦飞. 战略差异度、会计信息透明度与审计收费[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2024, 14(2): 305-313. https://doi.org/10.12677/orf.2024.142136

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