不同奖惩机制下电商快递使用绿色包装的演化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Packaging Adoption in E-commerce Express Delivery under Varied Incentive and Sanction Mechanisms

摘要: 随着电子商务和快递业的发展，与之产生的包装垃圾也愈演愈烈，加快电商快递的绿色包装十分必要。本文应用演化博弈理论研究了政府和电商快递企业在不同奖惩机制下的行为策略。首先，构建了静态奖惩和三种动态奖惩机制下政府和电商快递企业两方演化博弈模型。其次，讨论不同奖惩机制下的演化稳定策略。最后，对各个模型进行数值仿真，比较结果确定最优的奖惩机制，并分析关键参数对政府和电商快递企业行为的影响。研究结果表明，电商快递企业使用绿色包装概率与补贴上限值成反比，与惩罚上限值成正比。本研究有利于优化政府的奖惩机制、促进电商快递包装的绿色发展。

Abstract: With the advent of e-commerce and the burgeoning express delivery industry, the associated increase in packaging waste has become a significant concern, underscoring the urgency for accelerating the adoption of green packaging practices within this sector. This study leverages evolutionary game theory to examine the strategic behaviors of government bodies and e-commerce courier companies in the context of various incentive and penalty structures. Initially, the research constructs an evolutionary game model that encapsulates the interactions between government entities and e-commerce express firms under static as well as three dynamic incentive and disincentive mechanisms. Subsequently, it explores the evolutionary stable strategies emerging from these incentive and penalty frameworks. Through numerical simulations, the study assesses the efficacy of each model, identifies the most effective incentive and penalty mechanism, and elucidates the influence of critical parameters on the strategic choices of both the government and e-commerce courier services. The findings of the study demonstrate that the likelihood of e-commerce courier enterprises adopting green packaging is inversely related to the maximum subsidy threshold and directly correlated with the maximum penalty threshold. This research contributes valuable insights towards refining government incentive and penalty mechanisms, thereby fostering the sustainable development of e-commerce express packaging.