基于MILP的BORON中间相遇分析

MILP-Based for Middle-Meeting Cryptanalysis of BORON

摘要: BORON是新设计的超轻量级分组密码，被广泛应用于资源受限的设备中保护数据安全，然而受计算和存储资源限制，设计者可能为了追求高的软硬件实现效率而适度降低安全性。为了保障它在实际系统中有足够安全强度，需要评估BORON抵抗各种密码分析方法的能力。本文分析了BORON抵抗中间相遇攻击的能力。具体来说，利用混合整数线性规划自动化搜索算法，找到多条5轮中间相遇差分链，在此基础上构造了9轮的中间相遇分析路径，基于该路径最后恢复9轮BORON的密钥。整个攻击需要的时间、数据和存储复杂度分别为2^95.84次9轮加密、2^42.00个选择明文和2^94.90个64比特块。此结果是对BORON安全性分析的重要补充。

Abstract: BORON is a recently designed ultra-lightweight block cipher that is widely used to protect data security in resource-constrained devices; however, due to computational and storage resource constraints, designers may moderately reduce the security in order to pursue high hardware and software implementation efficiency. In order to guarantee its sufficient security strength in real systems, it is necessary to evaluate the ability of BORON to resist various cryptanalysis methods. In this paper, we analyse the ability of BORON to resist the middle-meeting attacks. Specifically, multiple 5-round middle-meeting differential chains are found using mixed-integer linear programming automated search algorithms, the 5 rounds of middle-meeting differential distinguisher based on the 9 rounds of middle-meeting differential attack, the 9 rounds of middle-meeting differential cryptanalysis of the BORON-128 requires time, data, memory complexities of 2^95.84 9-round encryption times, 2^42.00 chosen plaintext and 2^94.90 64-bit blocks; The attack results providing an important supplement to the security analysis of BORON.