AIGC独创性判断标准向作者主位的回归
The Recurrence to Author Standard in Judgement of the Originality of Artificial Intelligence Generated Content
摘要: 人工智能生成物进入全球范围内生产领域和文娱活动的速度正在加快,并且这个进程不可逆转,各国规制人工智能的法律正在摸索中陆续出台。不同地域关于人工智能生成内容的法律规范差异巨大,是因为各法域关于作品版权的认定规则相去甚远,独创性的判断标准从保护何种效益为先的角度分为“有无”和“高低”,其中的底色是版权对于保护作者权益以鼓励创作和促进传播实现更大的公共利益两条主线的永恒矛盾;且AIGC本身亦不同于传统作品,其生成过程中传统创作主体的隐身,电脑技术的“主导”,使得过去的判断标准难以精准评估AIGC。在此技术背景下,独创性判断标准应当首先回归作者主位,辅以最低限度的创造性程度要求,如此才能尽可能兼顾公私权益。
Abstract:
The speed of Artificial Intelligence Generated Content entering the global production field and entertainment activities is accelerating, which is irreversible, and the laws regulating AI in various countries are being groped and introduced one after another. The legal norms on the Artificial Intelligence generated content in different regions differ greatly, for the rules on the identification of copyright in different jurisdictions are far different, while the judgment criteria for originality could be divided into “with or without” and “high or low” from the perspective of what benefit is protected first. The basic color of copyright is to protect the rights and interests of authors to encourage creation. There stands an eternal contradiction between promoting communication and realizing greater public interests. In addition, AIGC itself is different from traditional works. The invisibility of traditional creative subjects and the “dominance” of computer technology in the generation process make it tough for the past judgment criteria to accurately evaluate AIGC. Under this technical background, the criterion of originality should first return to the author standard, supplemented by the minimum requirement of creativity, so as to take into account public and private interests as much as possible.
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