中天金融集团股权激励对企业财务绩效的影响研究
Research on the Impact of Equity Incentives on Corporate Financial Performance of Zhongtian Financial Group
摘要: 随着经济全球化的到来,上市企业的发展已成为全球瞩目的焦点。中国上市企业在面对全球化的机遇过程中也面临很大的压力,其中很突出的一大问题是管理层与股东之间的管理分歧,企业若想取得长远的发展必须得解决这一问题,也就是在这一境况下,股权激励政策开始被众多企业实施。为了了解股权激励对企业效绩的影响情况,本文从企业绩效中选择财务绩效这一更为具体和直观的要素进行研究,通过中国上市企业中天金融集团的股权激励案例的研究总结出,企业股权激励与企业财务绩效不是单一的正相关或负相关的关系。当高管的持股比例较低时,因为趋同效应的作用使得高管持股比例增加时企业财务绩效也随之增加;当企业高管的持股比例达到一定程度后,高管所在的管理层为了更多的权益往往会做出有损于公司利益的事而使得企业财务绩效开始下滑。
Abstract:
With the advent of economic globalization, the development of listed enterprises has become the focus of global attention. Chinese listed enterprises will also face great pressure in the face of global opportunities, one of the most prominent problems is the management differences between management and shareholders, which needs to be paid attention to the long-term development of enterprises, that is, in this case, equity incentive policies have begun to be implemented by many enterprises. In order to understand the impact of equity incentives on corporate performance, this paper selects the more specific and intuitive element of financial performance from enterprise performance, and concludes through the study of the equity incentive case of Zhongtian Financial Group, a listed enterprise in China, that the relationship between corporate equity incentive and corporate financial performance is not a single positive or negative correlation. When the shareholding ratio of executives is low, because the effect of convergence effect makes the shareholding ratio of executives increase, the financial performance of the enterprise also increases; when the shareholding ratio of corporate executives reaches a certain level, the management of the executives will do things that are harmful to the company for more rights and interests, and the financial performance of the enterprise will begin to decline.
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