电商平台独家交易行为对商家入驻决策的影响
The Influence of Exclusive Transaction Behavior of E-Commerce Platform on Business Settlement Decision
摘要: 随着京东诉阿里巴巴“二选一”案胜诉以及美团滥用市场支配地位被处罚，平台为争夺市场份额要求商家独家入驻的问题受到社会各界的广泛关注。本文构建了由两个平台企业与两个商家组成的双寡头市场模型，探讨了同质竞争商家先后进入市场情况下，后进入商家的最优入驻模式以及平台强制“二选一”行为对商家收益的影响。研究结果表明：在平台用户规模差异较大(小)时商家倾向于签署独家(非独家)协议；平台通过独家交易降低佣金对后进入商家是一种激励措施，会引发价格竞争促使其他平台商家也降低价格以保持竞争力；平台强制“二选一”行为并不总是对商家利润造成损害。
Abstract: With the victory of JD’s lawsuit against Alibaba and the punishment of Meituan’s abuse of market dominance, the issue of platforms demanding exclusive entry of merchants to compete for market share has attracted widespread attention from all sectors of society. This article constructs a duopoly market model consisting of two platform enterprises and two merchants, and explores the optimal entry mode for homogeneous competing merchants who enter the market one after another, as well as the impact of platform forced “two choice” behavior on merchant profits. The research results indicate that merchants tend to sign exclusive (non exclusive) agreements when there is a significant (small) difference in the scale of platform users; Reducing commissions through exclusive transactions on the platform is an incentive measure for later entry merchants, which can trigger price competition and encourage other platform merchants to lower prices to maintain competitiveness; The platform’s mandatory “two choice” behavior does not always harm the interests of merchants.
文章引用：李静, 蒋平剑, 薛雨薇. 电商平台独家交易行为对商家入驻决策的影响[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2024, 14(3): 510-521. https://doi.org/10.12677/orf.2024.143288

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