直播营销最低报价协议的反垄断法分析
Antitrust Law Analysis of Live Marketing Minimum Offer Agreement
摘要: 头部主播与供应商达成的直播营销最低报价协议,本质上是一种最惠国条款。看似让消费者享受到更优惠的价格,实际是主播逐步取得商品定价权,人为确定商品价格下限,巩固自身议价能力,阻碍在价格上的潜在竞争对手进入市场,并有助于削弱现有竞争对手,具有明显的反竞争效果。最低报价协议本身是一种正常的商业经营手段,本身并不违法,但其可能造成损害自由公平的市场竞争的结果。因此在规制过程中,要具体分析个案中直播最低报价协议的反竞争效果,综合市场结构、销售金额、用户活跃度等多方面因素,确定直播最低报价协议提供者的市场力量,准确界定现行法下该种协议可能构成的垄断行为。
Abstract:
The live marketing minimum offer agreement between the head anchor and the supplier is essentially a kind of platform MFN clause. Seemingly allowing consumers to enjoy more favorable prices, the actual anchor gradually obtains the right to price goods, artificially determines the lower limit of the price of goods, consolidates their own bargaining power, impedes the entry of potential competitors in the price of the market, and helps to weaken the existing competitors, with obvious anti-competitive effects. The minimum offer agreement itself is a normal means of business operation and is not in itself illegal, but it may have the result of jeopardizing free and fair market competition. Therefore, in the regulatory process, it is necessary to specifically analyze the anticompetitive effect of the live minimum offer agreement in individual cases, to integrate various factors such as the amount of sales, user activity, etc., to determine the market power of the provider of the live minimum offer agreement, and to accurately define the monopolistic behavior that this type of agreement may constitute under the current law.
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