2008年后中国大陆上市公司治理结构对公司绩效的影响
An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in Mainland China since 2008
DOI: 10.12677/ETW.2012.24017, PDF, HTML,   
作者: 张宇婷*, 李一泓, 郭祎姮*：武汉大学经济与管理学院，武汉；蔡恒进*：武汉大学国际软件学院，武汉
关键词: 公司治理；公司绩效；行业分析；Corporate Governance; Corporate Performance; Industry Analysis
摘要: 本文通过考虑我国股权分置改革以及金融危机的大背景，主要研究了2008年以后内地上市公司的治理结构对于公司绩效的影响。基于1837家上市公司数据的回归表明：国有持股比例对上市公司整体的治理绩效有显著的负影响，但对采掘业和社会服务业有显著的正影响；公司大股东、管理层以及机构投资者的持股比例对公司价值有显著的正影响；整体上，当保证大股东们总持股较集中时，增加大股东们之间的股权制衡度会对从正面影响公司的绩效，但采掘业中大股东分散持股不利于公司绩效；董事会规模和监事会规模对公司治理绩效有显著正影响；整体来看，独立董事比例对公司治理绩效影响不显著，但在信息技术业、批发零售和贸易业中，独立董事比例有显著正影响，在房地产业中，独立董事比例有显著负影响。
Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of corporate governance for companies listed in mainland China since 2008, considering the background of the financial crisis and the split share structure reform in China. Based on the data of 1837 listed companies, we conclude that: the proportion of state-owned shares has a significant negative impact on the governance performance overall, but it affects the governance posi-tively in Mining and Quarrying Industry and Social Services Sector; the stake of the largest shareholders of the company, the management, as well as institutional investors have a significant positive impact on the ef-fectiveness of corporate governance; equity balance of large shareholders can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, except for the Mining and Quarrying Industry; the size of the board and the board of supervisors have a significant positive impact on the governance performance; the proportion of independent directors in a board has no significant effects overall, but can improve the effectiveness of cooperate in IT Industry and Wholesale and Retail Trade Sector, and suppress the effectiveness in the Real Estate Sector.
文章引用：张宇婷, 李一泓, 郭祎姮, 蔡恒进. 2008年后中国大陆上市公司治理结构对公司绩效的影响[J]. 财富涌现与流转, 2012, 2(4): 68-76. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/ETW.2012.24017

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