竞争性供应链下的碳减排策略研究

Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies in Competitive Supply Chains

摘要: 考虑两条相互竞争的由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链系统，政府制定不同的环境政策对供应链决策产生影响。本文构建了以制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型，研究了政府不实施环境政策、实施补贴或税收政策的三种情况下供应链成员的最优决策，并进一步提出了政府环境政策的实施策略。研究表明：从经济利益角度看，制造商和零售商都会更加青睐于补贴政策；从环境保护视角却不一定，当污染程度高且减排成本高时，税收政策会带来更优的绿色效应；同时社会福利最优也要考虑到产品污染和减排成本，当两者都较小时，补贴政策会带来最大化的社会福利。

Abstract: Considering a competitive two-tier supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers, different environmental policies set by the government influence supply chain decisions. This paper constructs a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model and studies the optimal decisions of supply chain members under three scenarios: no environmental policy, subsidy policy, or tax policy implemented by the government. Furthermore, implementation strategies for government environmental policies are proposed. The research shows that from an economic perspective, both manufacturers and retailers prefer subsidy policies; however, from an environmental protection perspective, it may vary. When pollution levels are high and emission reduction costs are significant, tax policies can lead to better green effects. Additionally, optimizing social welfare requires considering product pollution and emission reduction costs. When both are low, subsidy policies can maximize social welfare.