论海德格尔技术批判理论的虚弱性——从马克思与海德格尔的本体论构境比较谈起

On the Frailty of Heidegger’s Critical Theory of Technology—From a Comparison of Marx’s and Heidegger’s Ontological Construction

摘要: 晚期海德格尔所开展的技术批判思想，是对其早期由《存在与时间》阐发的“此在”生存论分析所作出的、合乎现代世界发展状况的延申，展现了海德格尔彻底消解主体形而上学、回归存在本真的宏阔哲学理想。但是，这一批判在直面现代社会时所给出的解决方案存在着明显的虚弱性，这在他与马克思之间的本体论构境比较中表现地尤为显著：尽管二者都对感性活动/“上手状态”所开显的人的自然生存境域予以相当的重视，但是出于对“劳动–技术”形而上学的拒斥，海德格尔似乎有意回避了这种生存境域所由生发的、自然对人类生存的强大驱迫力。这直接构成了海德格尔技术批判理论的虚弱性根源。

Abstract: Heidegger’s technological critique in the late period is an extension of his earlier existential analysis of “Dasein” as expounded in Being and Time, which is in line with the development of the modern world, and demonstrates Heidegger’s grand philosophical ideal of completely dissolving the metaphysics of the subject and returning to the essence of existence. However, the solution given by this critique in facing the modern society is obviously weak, which is especially obvious in the comparison of the ontological framework between him and Marx: although both of them pay considerable attention to the natural realm of man’s existence revealed by sensual activity/“Zuhan- denheit”, out of their concern for the “labor-technology” and the “labor-technology”, Heidegger is not able to realize his own conception of “the realm of being”, and he is unable to realize his own conception of “the realm of being”. Although both pay considerable attention to the natural realm of human existence as revealed by sensual activity/the “hands-on state,” out of a rejection of the metaphysics of “labor-technology,” Heidegger seems to intentionally avoid the powerful force of nature’s compulsion for human existence that this realm of existence is born out of. This directly constitutes the source of the weakness of Heidegger’s critical theory of technology.