双边市场视域下平台企业横向并购行为分析
Behavior Analysis of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions of Platform Enterprises from the Perspective of Bilateral Markets
DOI: 10.12677/ecl.2024.133811, PDF,   
作者: 郭远维:贵州大学经济学院,贵州 贵阳
关键词: 平台企业并购动机垄断Platform Enterprises Motivation for Mergers and Acquisitions Monopoly
摘要: 平台企业横向并购涉及到反竞争效应以及对消费者福利的重要影响,因此成为反垄断法关注的焦点。鉴于当前平台企业市场主导地位的日益强化,深入剖析其并购垄断动因及其运作机制具有显著的法规意义。本研究着重于理解平台企业的独特性质,探究并购背后的意图,并揭示并购与垄断之间的内在关联,以期为规制平台并购行为及防范垄断风险提供理论依据。研究表明,平台企业与传统企业的特殊性加强了平台企业进行并购的动机,也使得平台企业更容易形成垄断地位。平台企业进行并购的主要动机包括扩大业务范围、获取关键资源、以及排斥市场竞争。这些并购动机与平台企业的特殊性相互作用,构成了平台企业并购形成垄断地位的核心机制。
Abstract: Horizontal mergers and acquisitions of platform enterprises involve anti competitive effects and important impacts on consumer welfare, making them a focus of attention in antitrust law. Given the increasingly dominant market position of platform enterprises, in-depth analysis of their merger and acquisition monopoly motives and operating mechanisms has significant regulatory significance. This study focuses on understanding the unique nature of platform enterprises, exploring the intentions behind mergers and acquisitions, and revealing the inherent relationship between mergers and acquisitions and monopolies, in order to provide theoretical basis for regulating platform M&A behavior and preventing monopoly risks. Research has shown that the uniqueness between platform enterprises and traditional enterprises strengthens the motivation for platform enterprises to engage in mergers and acquisitions, and also makes it easier for platform enterprises to form monopolistic positions. The main motivations for platform enterprises to engage in mergers and acquisitions include expanding their business scope, acquiring key resources, and excluding market competition. These motives for mergers and acquisitions interact with the particularity of platform enterprises, forming the core mechanism for platform enterprise mergers and acquisitions to form a monopoly position.
文章引用:郭远维. 双边市场视域下平台企业横向并购行为分析[J]. 电子商务评论, 2024, 13(3): 6564-6571. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2024.133811

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