试析布兰顿推论主义对德国观念论的应用与改造
An Analysis of the Application and Reform of Brandom’s Inferentialism to German Idealism
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2024.139329, PDF,   
作者: 王一凡:广西大学马克思主义学院,广西 南宁
关键词: 布兰顿推论主义康德知性黑格尔Brandom Inferentialism Kant Knowing Hegel
摘要: 匹兹堡学派从塞拉斯开始就强调康德哲学的种种洞见,也认同黑格尔对“直接性”的反对。布兰顿作为匹兹堡学派的一员,其对康德与黑格尔两者哲学资源的整合利用成为了他推论主义中关于知识起点和语义发展的重要组成部分。虽然布兰顿可能对康德哲学的知性理论有些误解,对黑格尔哲学的理解和传统解读也有一定差异,但这些解读是推论主义论证严密且有说服力的重要保证。可以说,康德与黑格尔哲学在推论主义中的地位和作用彰显了德国观念论在现代语言哲学与认识论中的强健性和宝贵价值。
Abstract: The Pittsburgh School, starting with Sellars, emphasized the insights of Kant’s philosophy and shared Hegel’s opposition to “immediacy.” As a member of the Pittsburgh School, Brandom’s integration of the philosophical resources of both Kant and Hegel became an important part of his inferentialism to the bases of knowledge and semantic development. While Brandom may have some misunderstandings of Kant’s philosophical theory of understanding and some differences between his understanding of Hegel’s philosophy and traditional interpretations, these readings are an important guarantee that inferentialism is rigorous and persuasive. Arguably, the place and role of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy in inferentialism highlights the robustness and valuable worth of German idealism in modern philosophy of language and epistemology.
文章引用:王一凡. 试析布兰顿推论主义对德国观念论的应用与改造[J]. 哲学进展, 2024, 13(9): 2205-2211. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2024.139329

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