标题:
再制造绿色供应链中政府关于补贴与费用的策略分析Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in Remanufacturing Green Supply Chains
作者:
任晓航, 刘乾
关键字:
绿色供应链, 斯塔克伯格模型, 补贴, 再循环费, 社会福利Green Supply Chains, Stackelberg Model, Subsidy, Recycling Fees, Social Welfare
期刊名称:
《Service Science and Management》, Vol.4 No.4B, 2015-07-17
摘要:
由于环境保护问题越来越受到世界各国和地区的高度重视，我国出台了一系列相关法规条例，以规范回收市场。同时，通过对生产商征收环保回收税费并对回收进行补贴的策略，在控制回收数量和生产数量的过程中起到了越来越重要的作用。本文为探究政府为实现社会福利最大化而实施的不同激励策略的效果，以及企业相应进行的不同决策，建立了绿色供应链博弈模型，分析了该模型在多种情况下的最优均衡结果。对比了政府基于回收率补贴与回收量补贴这两种激励策略的有效性。研究结果表明：政府采用任一种激励策略均能提高产品回收率；若政府若采用基于回收率补贴激励策略将更有效提高回收效率，实现社会的最大福利。Primarily due to environmental concerns and
legislative mandates, the disposition of end-of-life electronics products has
attracted much attention. Recycling fees and government subsidies played
important roles in encouraging or curtailing the recycled flows. Due to the
environmental protection problem attracting great importance by more and more
countries and regions around world, our country launched a series of
regulations and laws to standardize the recycling market. At the same time,
though taxing recycling fees on manufacturers and giving the recycling subsidy
to the recyclers, the government can control the recycling quantity and
production quantity. This paper establishes the green supply chain game model to
explore the governmentimplementations for the realization
of social welfare maximization, and the different incentive strategy of enterprises
corresponding to different implementations. Then, we analyze the optimal
equilibrium decision results of the game model in a variety of circumstances,
and compare effectiveness of the government subsidies strategies based on the
recovery percent or recovery quantity. The results show that the government using
any kind of incentive strategy can improve the product recovery; and the government’s
subsidy incentive strategy that is based on the recovery percent could
improve the recovery efficiency more effectively, realizing the
maximum social welfare.