考虑零售商和制造商公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链定价策略
Pricing Strategy for a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Fairness Concerns of Retailers and Manufacturers
摘要: 公平关切是零售商和制造商定价决策中的一个重要影响因素,以往相关研究大多假设仅零售商或制造商存在公平关切。本文建立了制造商和零售商均考虑公平关切时的双渠道模型,分析了公平关切水平、绿色制造水平、绿色投资水平和零售渠道忠诚度对最优绿色度、批发价格、零售价格、供应链及其成员利润的影响。此外,本文比较了有无公平关切时供应链及其成员的最优利润,且分析了公平关切水平对有无公平关切时供应链及其成员利润差的影响。结果表明,公平关切水平对供应链和制造商利润起着负向影响,当绿色投资水平较大时对零售商利润起着正向影响。其次,绿色投资水平和绿色制造水平对最优绿色度、批发价格、零售价格、供应链及其成员利润始终起着相反的作用。最后,通过数值实验验证了理论部分的正确性,并在批发价格为零的情况下分析了公平关切水平对最优绿色度、批发价格、零售价格、供应链及其成员利润的影响。
Abstract: Fairness concerns are an important influence in the pricing strategy of retailers and manufacturers, however most of the previous studies on the subject assumed the existence of fairness concerns only for retailers or manufacturers. This paper developed a dual-channel model when both manufacturers and retailers consider fairness concerns, and analyzed the impact of the levels of fairness concerns, green manufacturing, green investment, and retail channel loyalty on the optimal greenness, the wholesale price, the retail price, and the profits of the supply chain and its members. In addition, this paper compared the optimal profits of supply chain and its members with and without fairness concerns, and analyzed the impact of fairness concerns on the profit difference of the supply chain and its members between the existence and non-existence of fairness concerns. The results show that the level of fairness concerns negatively affects profits of the supply chain and the manufacturer, and positively affects retailer profits when the level of green investment is large. Secondly, the level of green investment and the level of green manufacturing always play opposite roles to the optimal greenness, the wholesale price, the retail price, and the profits of the supply chain and its members. Finally, we verified the correctness of the theoretical part through numerical experiments and analyzed the impact of the levels of fairness concerns on the optimal greenness, the wholesale price, the retail price, and the profits of the supply chain and its members in the case of zero wholesale price.
文章引用:孟建业. 考虑零售商和制造商公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链定价策略[J]. 电子商务评论, 2024, 13(4): 2650-2660. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2024.1341440

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