非对称信息下Cournot-Bertrand模型的动态复杂性
The Complex Dynamics of Cournot-Bertrand Model under Asymmetric Information
摘要: 本文首先建立了一个基于集群溢出的静态Cournot-Bertrand博弈模型。对于这个博弈，本文在异质预期的假定下提出了一个具有非对称信息的非线性动力学模型。并且在此基础上，探讨了Nash均衡点的局部稳定性。通过数值仿真，本文分析了集群溢出系数和外推精度对系统稳定性的影响，并且得到了以下结论。一方面，适当的集群溢出有利于系统的稳定性，但过多的集群溢出会导致系统陷入混沌。另一方面，信息不对称对系统稳定性的影响依赖于产品可替代率。当产品可替代率较小时，在此博弈中处于优势地位的公司掌握的有效信息越多越不利于系统的稳定性，但当产品可替代率较大时，信息越准确，系统的稳定性越强。
Abstract: This paper firstly constructs a static Cournot-Bertrand game based on cluster spillovers. Through the first-order optimality conditions, the Nash equilibrium is acquired. For such a game, a nonlinear dynamics with information asymmetry is established. Then we investigate the local stability of the Nash equilibrium. Through numerical simulation, this paper analyzes the influence of spillover coefficient and extrapolation accuracy on the stability of the system, and obtains the following conclsions. On the one hand, appropriate cluster spillover is conducive to the stability of the system, but too much cluster spillover will lead to chaos. On the other hand, the impact of information asymmetry on system stability depends on the product substitutability. Under the small product substitution rate, the more effective information the company has, the more unfavorable it is to the system stability. However, as the product substitution rate is large, the more accurate the information is, the stronger the system stability is.
文章引用：王雪婧. 非对称信息下Cournot-Bertrand模型的动态复杂性[J]. 电子商务评论, 2024, 13(4): 5019-5030. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2024.1341731

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