基于两阶段三方演化博弈的医院合同能源管理协作机制研究

Two-Stage Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for the Cooperation Mechanism of Energy Performance Contracting Project Led by Hospital

摘要: 合同能源管理是帮助医院节能的有效途径。针对如何提升医院合同能源管理项目成效的问题，构建了医院主导、地方政府、节能公司和临床科室、后勤部门分别参与的两阶段演化博弈模型，并利用系统动力学探究了关键因素对各方策略演化趋势的影响。研究发现：节能公司以盈利为目的，医院是否积极协作取决于节能公司的协作状态；政策倾斜力度和项目资金补助对医院和节能公司的协作积极性的影响相反；违规罚款会增强医企的协作积极性，但罚款力度过大会加大医院营运负担，间接影响项目成效和地方政府的协作积极性；合理的绩效奖惩机制既可增强下属部门的工作积极性，又不严重影响医院开支；溢出收益能减缓“搭便车”的一方的参与意愿下降速度，但无法改变其变化趋势；医院和临床科室积极协作会增强彼此的参与意愿；后勤部门的积极监管可以督促各科室高效完成节能任务，但监管成本过高会降低后勤部门的协作积极性。这反映了医院合同能源管理工作中的常见问题，对提升项目成效、提高医院管理水平和运营效率具有参考价值。

Abstract: Energy performance contracting (EPC) is an effective way to help hospitals reduce energy consumption. To enhance the cooperation efficiency of multiple participants and improve the project, this paper constructs a two-stage tripartite evolutionary game model in which the hospital leads, the local government, the energy service company, the clinical department and the logistics department participate. Besides, the paper studies the influence of critical parameters on the strategies of all participants by system dynamic theory. The main conclusions are as follows: Energy service companies prioritize profit, and whether hospitals actively cooperate depends on the cooperation status of energy-saving companies. The impact of policy preference and penalty policy on hospitals and energy service companies’ participation intention is opposite. Violation penalties could enhance the participation intention of both hospitals and energy service companies, but excessive violation penalties increase hospitals’ operating burden and indirectly affect local governments’ participation intention. A reasonable performance reward and punishment mechanism can enhance the working enthusiasm of the clinical department and the logistics department, without significantly affecting expenditure. Spillover benefits can slow down the decline of free-rider’s participation intention, but cannot change the downtrend of free-rider’s participation intention. Active cooperation between hospitals and clinical departments will enhance each other’s participation intention. Effective supervision by the logistics department can encourage clinical departments to complete tasks efficiently, but excessive regulatory costs will reduce the participation intention of logistics department. These conclusions reflect common problems in hospital energy performance contracting projects and have reference value for enhancing project effectiveness, improving hospital management, and increasing operational efficiency.