基于激励相容理论的金融科技创新监管策略研究

Strategic Research on Fintech Innovation and Regulation Based on Incentive Compatibility Theory

摘要: 随着金融科技的迅猛发展，其风险日益显现而监管却相对滞后。本文基于激励相容理论分析了金融科技创新与监管的激励冲突问题，并通过构建包含激励机制的金融科技创新监管动态演化模型，设计了激励相容的监管机制。结果表明：激励相容的监管机制能够优化监管资源的配置，在金融科技企业与监管机构之间形成(合规创新，适度监管)的正反馈激励机制。因此，监管机构需要秉持激励相容的思想，通过最优的机制设计，设计出一种既包容又审慎的监管机制，以实现金融科技“创新–监管”的动态平衡。

Abstract: With the rapid development of fintech, its risks are becoming increasingly apparent and regulation is relatively lagging behind. Based on the incentive compatibility theory, this paper analyzes the incentive conflict between fintech innovation and regulation, and designs an incentive-compatible regulatory mechanism by constructing a dynamic evolution model of fintech innovation supervision that includes incentive mechanisms. The results show that the incentive-compatible regulatory mechanism can optimize the allocation of regulatory resources and form a positive feedback incentive mechanism (compliance innovation and appropriate supervision) between fintech enterprises and regulators. Therefore, regulators need to uphold the idea of incentive compatibility and design an inclusive and prudent regulatory mechanism through optimal mechanism design, so as to achieve the dynamic balance of “innovation and supervision” in fintech.