灰色市场网络效应对不同市场中企业定价决策的影响

The Impact of Grey Market Network Effect on Pricing Decisions of Enterprises in Different Markets

摘要: 互联网为消费者和企业决策提供了充分的信息，市场中消费者的数量便成为影响消费者决策的重要变量，这在灰色市场中体现得尤为明显。因此，研究灰色市场产生的网络效应如何改变市场均衡进而影响生产商和投机者的决策是有必要的。根据现实情境，在灰色市场产生网络效应的情况下，分别构建市场结构为生产商主导、第三方投机者跟随，第三方投机者主导、生产商跟随的两种博弈竞争模型。本文将灰色市场消费者数量作为网络效应影响因子纳入消费者的效用函数中，结合激励相容机制推导出各个市场的产品需求函数及生产商和投机者的利润函数，利用逆向归纳法得出不同市场中的企业产品定价和供给决策。在此基础上，对均衡结果关于网络效应强度进行灵敏度分析，揭示灰色市场的网络效应对生产商和投机者在产品定价和供应决策中的影响。研究表明，第三方投机者做博弈领导者时，网络效应对均衡结果的影响最优；第三方投机者做跟随者时，网络效应的影响相对中和。对比分析两种情况下的均衡结果，本研究认为低价市场的监管者应维护消费者利益，采取相对严格的监管措施，而高价市场可以采用包容性监管态度，在合理范围内接受灰市产品流通。

Abstract: The Internet provides sufficient information for consumers and enterprises to make decisions. The number of consumers in the market becomes an important variable that affects consumer decision-making, which is particularly evident in the gray market. Therefore, it is necessary to study how the network effects generated by grey markets can change market equilibrium and affect the decisions of producers and speculators. According to reality, in the case of network effects in the grey market, two game competition models are constructed for the market structure: producer-led and third-party speculators following, and third-party speculators leading and producers following. This article incorporates the number of grey market consumers as a network effect influencing factor into the utility function of consumers, and combines incentive compatibility mechanisms to derive product demand functions and profit functions for producers and speculators in various markets. Using reverse induction, pricing and supply decisions for enterprise products in different markets are obtained. On this basis, sensitivity analysis is conducted on the equilibrium results regarding the strength of network effects, revealing the impact of grey market network effects on producers and speculators in product pricing and supply decisions. Research has shown that when third-party speculators act as game leaders, the impact of network effects on equilibrium results is optimal; when third-party speculators act as followers, the impact of network effects is relatively neutral. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium results in two scenarios, this study suggests that regulators in low-priced markets should safeguard consumer interests and adopt relatively strict regulatory measures, while high-priced markets can adopt an inclusive regulatory attitude and accept the circulation of grey market products within a reasonable range.