面对损失厌恶消费者的渠道策略研究
Research on Channel Strategies When Facing Loss-Averse Consumers
摘要: 考虑一个由制造商和消费者构成的Hotelling线性市场,假设制造商是理性的,消费者是损失厌恶的,消费者的参照价格是公知的市场价。进一步假设消费者是异质的。无论采用集中式销售还是分散式销售,制造商的最优产品质量和最优出售价格不变。但是,相对于集中式销售渠道,消费者在分散式销售渠道下购买产品的价格相对较高。在单位距离成本高和参照价格高或者低的情况下,制造商会在集中式渠道中延长产品线以满足足够多的市场需求,并保持其最优策略与延长前相同。若不满足上述情况,制造商仍要延长产品线,则制造商会因需求的溢出而被迫降低销售价格。
Abstract: Consider a Hotelling linear market consisting of a manufacturer and consumers, where the manufacturer is assumed to be rational and the consumers are loss-averse, with the reference price being the publicly known market price. Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous. Regardless of whether a centralized or decentralized sales channel is adopted, the manufacturer’s optimal product quality and optimal selling price remain unchanged. However, compared to centralized sale channel, the price consumers pay for the product is relatively higher in decentralized sales channels. When the unit transportation cost is high and the reference price is either high or low, the manufacturer will extend the product line in the centralized channel to meet sufficient market demand while maintaining the same optimal strategy as before the expansion. If these conditions are not met, the manufacturer still extends the product line, the manufacturer will be forced to lower the selling price due to demand overflow.
文章引用:常一桐, 郭永江. 面对损失厌恶消费者的渠道策略研究[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2024, 14(6): 889-905. https://doi.org/10.12677/orf.2024.146587

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