出口补贴博弈、国家利益与世贸组织协议

Export Subsidy Game, National Benefits and the WTO Agreement

摘要: 世界贸易组织禁止会员国对其出口商品予以补贴，并视补贴出口为一种不公平的竞争行为，但为何仍有出口补贴竞赛的产生以及随之而来的一连串出口国之间的相互指控，世贸组织出口补贴的协议对相关国家和全世界的利益有何影响，这些课题在以往文献并未获得充分的讨论，本文的研究目的即是利用一个简单的模型详细讨论这些议题。本文的研究结果显示，拥有低生产成本出口商的国家在有出口补贴情况下的福利优于禁止出口补贴时的福利水平；但是当所有出口国厂商皆是高生产成本或生产成本相近时，出口国遵守世贸组织协议(即不补贴出口企业)才是较佳的政策；换言之，世贸组织的出口补贴协议未必对所有出口国皆有利。此外，本文也发现当出口国对其出口商品或服务提供补贴时，整个世界的总福利会因此提高。

Abstract: The World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits member countries from subsidizing their exports and regards subsidized exports as an unfair competition. But why are there still export subsidy competitions and a series of mutual accusations among exporting countries? The impact of subsidy agreements on the interests of relevant countries and the world has not been fully discussed in the previous literature. The purpose of this paper is to use a simple model to discuss these issues in detail. This paper shows that exporting countries with low production cost exporters have higher welfare levels with export subsidies than when export subsidies are prohibited; but when all exporting manufacturers have high production costs or similar production costs, it is a better policy for exporting countries to comply with the WTO agreement (that is, not to subsidize export enterprises); in other words, the WTO export subsidy agreement may not be beneficial to all exporting countries. In addition, this paper also finds that when exporting countries provide subsidies for their exported goods or services, the total welfare of the entire world will therefore increase.