考虑网络外部性的数字平台技术共享定价策略

Pricing Strategy for Digital Platform Technology Sharing Considering Network Externalities

摘要: 本文采用Stackelberg博弈模型研究由一个数字技术平台企业和一个生产商组成的供应链系统，研究进行数字技术共享的供应链双方的均衡价格和最优利润并引入网络外部性来研究双方的最优决策变化。研究表明：集中决策下平台的利润和最优期望技术研发投入始终高于分散决策；在网络外部性的影响下，两种决策下的产品价格和研发成本投入都有不同程度的提高，集中决策下的数字技术平台为了供应链的整体利益，更有动机进行数字技术的研发和成本投入，实现利益最大化。前期数字平台技术研发成本较低时，集中决策下的产品售价大于分散决策产品售价，但随平台成本提升，优势逐渐弱化，甚至消失。另有研究表明数字平台选择进行技术共享的最优时间节点为网络外部性达到峰值后。最后本文通过设计契约合作模型实现了供应链双方的整体协调，解决了网络外部性下分散决策的劣势扩大化问题。

Abstract: This paper adopts the Stackelberg game model to study a supply chain system composed of a digital technology platform enterprise and a manufacturer. It investigates the equilibrium prices and optimal profits of both parties in the supply chain that share digital technology and introduces network externalities to study the changes in their optimal decisions. The research shows that under centralized decision-making, the platform’s profit and optimal expected technology R&D investment are always higher than under decentralized decision-making. Under the influence of network externalities, the product prices and R&D cost investments under both decision-making modes increase to varying degrees. The digital technology platform under centralized decision-making is more motivated to invest in technology R&D and cost inputs for the overall benefit of the supply chain, maximizing profits. When the initial R&D cost of the digital platform is low, the product price under centralized decision-making is higher than that under decentralized decision-making. However, as the platform cost increases, the advantage gradually weakens and may even disappear. Additionally, the research indicates that the optimal timing for the digital platform to choose technology sharing is after the network externality reaches its peak. Finally, this paper achieves overall coordination between both parties in the supply chain by designing a contract cooperation model, addressing the issue of the amplification of disadvantages under decentralized decision-making in the presence of network externalities.