所有制结构与商业银行风险承担
Ownership Structure and Commercial Bank Risk-Taking
DOI: 10.12677/isl.2025.91002, PDF,   
作者: 冯书源:上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院,上海
关键词: 所有制结构商业银行风险承担Ownership Structure Commercial Bank Risk-Taking
摘要: 2020年中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划纲要(简称“十四五”规划)提出“实现经济高质量发展”的目标,成为当前我国国民经济工作的重点。商业银行作为国家实体经济的命脉,成为国家发展的重点关注对象,关于商业银行风险承担的讨论也在不断提高。在此过程中,政府通过一系列手段和方法对银行实体施加影响、进行干预或建立联系以宏观调控银行经济的整体稳定,这些手段和方法包括但不限于所有制控制、政治关联等。本文通过关注银行所有制结构,探究其对商业银行风险承担水平的影响。基于中国2010年至2022年351家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,本研究发现,国有银行承担了银行业最核心的信用风险,同时也面临着巨大的资金流动压力,而非国有银行的参与能够缓解银行业的高风险水平,提高客户信用审查和资金流动效率,确保银行业的风险水平总体可控。该研究结论不仅证实了“多元经济模式”在我国当前的银行经济中实现了最优配置,同时也为今后国家制定针对性的风险管理策略和政策提供科学依据,为推动商业银行持续稳定发展提供积极意义。
Abstract: The Outline of the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China in 2020 puts forward the goal of “realizing high-quality economic development”, which has become the focus of China’s current national economic work. Commercial banks, as the lifeblood of the real economy of the country, have become the focus of national development, and the discussion on risk bearing of commercial banks has been increasing. In this process, the government influences, intervenes, or establishes links with banking entities to macro-regulate the overall stability of the banking economy through a series of means and methods, which include but are not limited to ownership control, political affiliation, and so on. By focusing on bank ownership structure, this paper explores its impact on the level of risk-taking in commercial banks. Based on unbalanced panel data of 351 commercial banks in China from 2010 to 2022, this study finds that state-owned banks bear the most core credit risk of the banking sector and also face tremendous pressure on capital flows, while the participation of non-state-owned banks can mitigate the high risk level of the banking sector, improve the efficiency of customer credit check and capital flows, and ensure that the risk level of the banking sector is generally controllable. The conclusion of this study not only confirms that the “diversified economic model” has realized the optimal allocation in China’s current banking economy, but also provides a scientific basis for the country to formulate targeted risk management strategies and policies in the future, and provides a positive significance for the promotion of the sustainable and stable development of commercial banks.
文章引用:冯书源. 所有制结构与商业银行风险承担[J]. 交叉科学快报, 2025, 9(1): 8-17. https://doi.org/10.12677/isl.2025.91002

参考文献

[1] Bergeran, A.N., Clarkegrg, G.R.G., Cullr, R., Klapper, L. and Udell, G.F. (2005) Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Joint Analysis of the Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29, 2179-2221.
[2] Tihanyi, L., Aguilera, R.V., Heugens, P., van Essen, M., Sauerwald, S., Duran, P., et al. (2019) State Ownership and Political Connections. Journal of Management, 45, 2293-2321. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[3] Boubakri, N., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O. and Hossain, M. (2020) Post-privatization State Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking: Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 64, Article ID: 101625. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[4] Dong, Y., Meng, C., Firth, M. and Hou, W. (2014) Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China. International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 120-130. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[5] Zhu, W. and Yang, J. (2016) State Ownership, Cross-Border Acquisition, and Risk-Taking: Evidence from China’s Banking Industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 71, 133-153. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[6] Lu, H., Pan, H. and Zhang, C. (2015) Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits. The Journal of Law and Economics, 58, 829-861. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[7] Costello, A.M., Granja, J. and Weber, J. (2019) Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks? Journal of Accounting Research, 57, 603-637. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[8] Zhang, L., Hsu, S., Xu, Z. and Cheng, E. (2020) Responding to Financial Crisis: Bank Credit Expansion with Chinese Characteristics. China Economic Review, 61, Article ID: 101233. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[9] Hung, C.D., Jiang, Y., Liu, F.H., Tu, H. and Wang, S. (2017) Bank Political Connections and Performance in China. Journal of Financial Stability, 32, 57-69. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[10] Al-Shboul, M., Maghyereh, A., Hassan, A. and Molyneux, P. (2020) Political Risk and Bank Stability in the Middle East and North Africa Region. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 60, Article ID: 101291. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[11] Elnahass, M., Trinh, V.Q. and Li, T. (2021) Global Banking Stability in the Shadow of Covid-19 Outbreak. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 72, Article ID: 101322. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[12] Haß, L.H., Vergauwe, S. and Zhang, Z. (2017) State-ownership and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from Corporate Fraud. The European Journal of Finance, 25, 550-567. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[13] Kong, D., Pan, Y., Tian, G.G. and Zhang, P. (2020) Ceos’ Hometown Connections and Access to Trade Credit: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 62, Article ID: 101574. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[14] Berger, A.N., Hasan, I. and Zhou, M. (2009) Bank Ownership and Efficiency in China: What Will Happen in the World’s Largest Nation? Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 113-130. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[15] Zhang, D., Cai, J., Dickinson, D.G. and Kutan, A.M. (2016) Non-Performing Loans, Moral Hazard and Regulation of the Chinese Commercial Banking System. Journal of Banking & Finance, 63, 48-60. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef