独白:从思维到言语的过渡——“独白”的时间性和功能性概念层次分析
Monologue: The Transition from Thought to Speech —An Analysis of the Temporal and Functional Conceptual Levels of “Monologue”
摘要: 一般而言,独白被当作一种个体与自我对话的方式而被不假思索的运用。独白具有某种内省机制,还带一点审美趣味,往往被文学、戏剧所钟爱。但独白到底是什么?似乎还缺乏全面的审视。语言用于交流,而作为一种言语形式的独白本身不是为了交流,因此它是一种独特而微妙的“言说”。语言也用于思考,那么,独白又是一种思维形式。我们几乎可以说任何思维的概念都带有“语言性”,但我们大概不能说任何思维概念都带有“言说性”,例如我思、反思、沉思等。事实上大部分思维概念都不具有言说性质,那么这种比较少见的思维和言语的二重性能够赋予“独白”怎样的独特性呢?本文试图通过对“独白”“内部言语”和“自我对话”等概念的辨析,来探索“独白”的从思维到言语的过渡性质。并以此作为进路,通过概念分析确立“独白”的时间性和功能性概念层次。还会稍微提及“独白”概念在现代性问题和理性重构中的某种可能性。
Abstract: Monologues are generally used thoughtlessly as a way for an individual to dialogue with oneself. Featuring a certain introspective mechanism and an aesthetic appeal, monologues are favored by literature and drama. But what exactly is a monologue? It seems there is still a lack of comprehensive scrutiny. Language is used for communication, and as a form of speech, monologue is not meant for communication, thus making it a unique and subtle “utterance”. Language is also used for thinking, hence, monologue is a form of thought. It could be said that almost every concept of thought has “linguistic” characteristics, but it is probably not accurate to say that every concept of thought has “utterance” characteristics, such as thinking, reflecting, and contemplating. In fact, most concepts of thought do not possess the nature of utterance. What unique characteristics can this rare duality of thought and speech confer upon “monologue”? This paper attempts to explore the transitional nature of monologue from thought to speech through the analysis of concepts such as “monologue”, “internal speech”, and “self-dialogue”. Using this as a starting point, the paper establishes the temporal and functional conceptual levels of “monologue” through conceptual analysis. It also briefly touches on the potential implications of the concept of “monologue” in issues of modernity and rational reconstruction.
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