论感知作为激情对于心–身问题的解释
On the Interpretation of Perception as Passion for Mind-Body Issues
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2025.142073, PDF,   
作者: 赵思蒙:内蒙古师范大学科学技术史研究院,内蒙古 呼和浩特
关键词: 笛卡尔《论灵魂的激情》印象心物二元Descartes “On the Passion of the Soul” Impression Heart Object Duality
摘要: 感知被笛卡尔视为心灵的一种能力,而在《论灵魂的激情》中,感知被视为灵魂的一种激情,还特别强调了其与身体的联系,并为其描绘了一整套生理上的感知机制。互不干涉的心灵与物质在感知中得到结合,这既是笛卡尔寻求关于世界的确定性知识的要求,也是他对于弥合心灵与物质二分的尝试。但受限于当时的科学与社会条件以及笛卡尔体系自身的限制,笛卡尔对感知的描绘是模糊的,也未能解决他试图解决的问题。对感知的描述也因此成为笛卡尔学说中较为暧昧难解的一个部分。
Abstract: Perception is regarded by Descartes as an ability of the mind, and in “On the Passion of the Soul”, perception is seen as a passion of the soul, with particular emphasis on its connection to the body and a complete set of physiological perception mechanisms. The non-interfering combination of mind and matter in perception is not only Descartes’ requirement for seeking deterministic knowledge about the world, but also his attempt to bridge the dichotomy between mind and matter. However, limited by the scientific and social conditions of the time, as well as the limitations of the Cartesian system itself, Descartes’ depiction of perception was vague and failed to solve the problem he was trying to solve. The description of perception has therefore become a rather ambiguous and difficult part of Descartes’ theory.
文章引用:赵思蒙. 论感知作为激情对于心–身问题的解释[J]. 哲学进展, 2025, 14(2): 152-157. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2025.142073

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