零售商反向补贴下供应链成员的策略博弈分析

Strategic Game Analysis of Supply Chain Members under Retailer Reverse Subsidy

摘要: 在供应链管理中，反向补贴是指零售商为获得更优惠的产品条件或其他利益而向制造商支付一定费用的行为。实际上，这种反向补贴可以被视为一种合作形式，因为它通过利益分配使双方均能受益。本文构建了一个包含单一制造商和单一零售商的两级供应链激励模型，旨在通过考虑零售商对制造商的反向补贴，优化双方的合作关系。在该模型中，制造商和零售商通过Nash均衡实现各自利益最大化的决策目标，其中制造商决定是否研发绿色技术，而零售商则决定是否提供补贴，以寻找最优策略组合。通过对供应链的Stackelberg博弈分析，本文确定了制造商的最优投入成本和零售商的补贴范围，为双方提供了实现利益最大化的最优策略建议。最后，通过数值仿真分析了零售商补贴系数对批发价、零售价、研发水平、以及制造商和零售商利润的影响。

Abstract: In supply chain management, a reverse subsidy is a payment made by a retailer to a manufacturer in order to obtain more favorable product terms or other benefits. In fact, this reverse subsidy can be regarded as a form of cooperation because it benefits both parties through the distribution of benefits. In this paper, we construct a two-level supply chain incentive model containing a single manufacturer and a single retailer, aiming to optimize their cooperative relationship by considering the retailer’s reverse subsidy to the manufacturer. In this model, the manufacturer and the retailer achieve their respective profit maximization decision objectives through Nash equilibrium, in which the manufacturer decides whether to develop green technologies or not and the retailer decides whether to provide subsidies or not to find the optimal strategy combination. Through the Stackelberg game analysis of the supply chain, this paper determines the optimal input cost of the manufacturer and the subsidy range of the retailer, and provides the optimal strategy suggestions for both parties to maximize their interests. Finally, the effects of retailer subsidy coefficients on wholesale price, retail price, R&D level, and profits of manufacturers and retailers are analyzed through numerical simulation.