限期认缴制下的董事催缴出资义务
Directors’ Duty to Call Contributions under the Limited Contribution System
摘要: 至本次《公司法》出台,我国有限公司资本缴纳经历了从完全认缴到限期认缴的制度优化,也经历了从股东除名到催缴失权的制度转身。限期认缴制属于对股东出资义务的强制规定,通过法律对资本制度的后端管制,修补完全认缴制的制度缺陷。股东除名制度的确立和催缴失权制度的增设,标志着股东违反出资义务在组织法意义上的责任机制正式得以确立。完善我国资本形成制度,需要推动限期认缴制与催缴失权制中的董事催缴出资义务协调适用。但在董事履行催缴出资义务的司法实践中,有关董事催缴适用情形、催缴通知宽限期、董事责任风险等问题尚存争议。针对上述问题,可采取扩张解释董事催缴适用情形、完善催缴出资的配套保障措施和限制违反催缴义务的赔偿责任等解决方案。
Abstract: Up to the introduction of the Company Law, the capital payment of China’s limited companies has experienced the system optimisation from full contribution to limited contribution, and also experienced the system transformation from the removal of shareholders’ names to the loss of the right to call for contributions. The limited period contribution system belongs to the mandatory provisions on the obligation of shareholders to make capital contributions, and mends the system defects of the full contribution system through the back-end control of the capital system by law. The establishment of the system of shareholders’ delisting and the addition of the system of failure to call for contributions marks the formal establishment of the mechanism of responsibility for shareholders’ violation of capital contribution obligations in the sense of the organizational law. To improve China’s capital formation system, it is necessary to promote the coordinated application of the limited contribution system and the director’s obligation to call for contributions in the call default system. However, in the judicial practice of the director’s obligation to call for contributions, there are still controversies about the applicable circumstances of the director’s call, the grace period of the notice of call, and the risk of the director’s liability. To address these issues, solutions can be adopted such as expanding the interpretation of the circumstances applicable to the directors’ call, improving the supporting safeguards for the call and limiting the liability for breach of the call obligation.
文章引用:黄晓雨. 限期认缴制下的董事催缴出资义务[J]. 法学, 2025, 13(2): 339-346. https://doi.org/10.12677/ojls.2025.132050

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