论间接规避著作权技术措施行为的刑法规制

On the Criminal Regulation of Indirect Circumvention of Copyright Technological Protection Measures

摘要: 技术手段并不是著作权法律所独享的权益。以霍菲尔德的权力框架为切入点，技术手段具有的权利性质原本应该被归类为“特权”(privilege)，然而在著作权法中却被当成了“权利”(right)。这类差异导致著作权法规对技术手段的执行缺少应有的限制。虽然《刑法修正案(十一)》已将故意逃避或损害技术手段的行为纳入刑事法律的管制范围，但对于回避技术手段的行为，刑法的界定不宜与著作权法规中的侵权行动划等号，尤其不应将提供绕过技术手段的举动一并纳入。相对而言，宜借助法律解释，对刑事法规所规制的行为界限进行适度收窄，才能在惩处违法之际兼顾著作权主体与社会大众的利益平衡。

Abstract: Technological protection measures are not an exclusive right of copyright. From the perspective of Hohfeld’s rights matrix, the right to technological measures should belong to a “privilege”. However, in copyright law, it is treated as a “right”. This deviation causes a lack of necessary restrictions on the implementation of technological measures. Although the Criminal Law Amendment (XI) includes intentional circumvention or destruction of technological measures within its scope of criminal regulation, the definition of circumvention of technological measures in criminal law should not be entirely equated with the definition of infringement in copyright law, especially should not include the provision of tools for circumventing technological measures. Instead, the scope of criminal regulation should be reasonably limited through legal interpretation to balance the interests of copyright holders and the public while combating crime.