情绪状态对政府与科创主体策略选择的影响研究

Studies on the Impact of Emotional States on Government Strategic Choices and the Subjects of Scientific and Technological Innovation

摘要: 本文以科创领域中联合攻关决策为研究对象，探索情绪对策略选择的影响。基于等级依赖效用(RDEU)理论，构建了政府与科创主体之间的演化博弈模型。模型中政府和科创主体的监管与合作策略受到情绪的影响，并通过RDEU函数进行量化。随后，本文分析了不同情绪组合情形下的演化稳定策略，并设计算例进行仿真模拟。仿真结果表明：情绪波动不仅影响决策稳定性，还会导致策略选择的动态变化。当科创主体情绪乐观时，可能出现“过度合作”现象，导致资源过度投入，而悲观情绪则会抑制合作意愿。进一步分析发现，政府监管力度与创新激励之间存在阈值效应，即适度监管能够促进创新，但超过阈值后的过度监管反而会抑制合作。

Abstract: This study investigates the joint research decision-making in the science and technology innovation (STI) field as the research object and explores the impact of emotions on strategy selection. Based on the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) theory, an evolutionary game model between the government and STI subject is constructed. In the model, the regulatory and cooperative strategies of the government and STI subject are affected by emotions and are quantified through the RDEU function. Subsequently, the paper analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies under different emotional combinations and designs numerical examples for simulation. The simulation results show that emotional fluctuations not only affect the stability of decision-making but also lead to dynamic changes in strategy selection. When STI subjects are optimistic, there may be an “over-cooperation” phenomenon, resulting in excessive resource input, while pessimistic emotions will suppress the willingness to cooperate. Further analysis reveals that there is a threshold effect between government regulatory intensity and innovation incentives, that is, moderate regulation can promote innovation, but excessive regulation beyond the threshold will instead inhibit cooperation.