基于GONE理论对我国科创板上市企业财务舞弊事件的舞弊动因分析——以A企业为例

Analysis of Fraud Motivations Based on GONE Theory for Financial Fraud Incidents among Companies Listed on China’s Sci-Tech Innovation Board—Taking A Enterprise as an Example

摘要: 我国高新技术企业相关认定的重新修订给其成长提供了极大的政治支持，高新技术产业从2016年开始持续保持高速增长。但与此同时，一些问题也逐渐显露出来。本文基于GONE理论，以A企业为例，对我国科创板上市企业财务舞弊事件进行了深入分析。A企业通过虚增营业收入、隐瞒关联方交易、虚增在建工程等手段，长期进行财务造假，最终被监管部门查处并终止上市。文章从GONE理论的四个维度——贪婪、机会、需求和暴露出发，探讨了A企业财务舞弊的动因。研究发现，高管受到股权激励的诱惑、股权结构失衡、内部控制失效、资金需求压力以及信息不对称等因素共同导致了舞弊行为的发生。此外，审计机构独立性不足、处罚力度较轻以及监管制度不完善也为舞弊提供了可乘之机。最后，文章从四个影响因子方面给出防舞弊建议，为高新企业敲响警钟、提供借鉴。

Abstract: The revision of the relevant recognition of high tech enterprises in our country has provided great political support for their growth, and the high tech enterprises have maintained high-speed growth since 2016. But at the same time, some problems are gradually emerging. This article is based on the GONE theory and takes Company A as an example to conduct an in-depth analysis of financial fraud incidents in Chinese companies listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board. A company engaged in long-term financial fraud by inflating operating income, concealing related party transactions, and inflating construction in progress, and was ultimately investigated and terminated from listing by regulatory authorities. The article explores the causes of financial fraud in Company A from the four dimensions of GONE theory: greed, opportunity, demand, and exposure. Research has found that the temptation of equity incentives, imbalanced equity structures, ineffective internal controls, financial pressure, and information asymmetry among executives collectively contribute to the occurrence of fraudulent behavior. In addition, the lack of independence of audit institutions, light penalties, and imperfect regulatory systems also provide opportunities for fraud. Finally, the article provides anti fraud suggestions from four influencing factors, sounding the alarm and providing references for high-tech enterprises.