阿姆斯特朗论存在真理的使真者及其问题

Armstrong on Truthmakers for Existential Truths and Its Problems

摘要: 使真者理论是一种认为真理的真依赖于外部实在的理论，它从实在论的立场对真理给出解释。阿姆斯特朗建立了最为系统和庞大的使真者理论，他以事态这种实体为中心，并以殊相和属性为辅助，确定了各种真理的使真者。但在阿姆斯特朗的体系中，存在真理的使真者问题并没有得到充分讨论，阿姆斯特朗认为，存在真理的使真者就是相关的个体而不是事态。但笔者认为，根据阿姆斯特朗的必然主义与蕴涵原则，结合薄殊相与厚殊相的区分，如果个体是薄殊相，那么它充当一些存在真理的使真者无法满足这两个原则，而事态以及厚殊相则可以满足这两个原则，因而事态是这些存在真理更合适的使真者。

Abstract: Truthmakers Theory, which posits that the truth depends on external reality, offers a realist explanation of truth. David Armstrong developed the most systematic and comprehensive framework of Truthmakers Theory, centering on states of affairs as entities, supplemented by particulars and properties, to identify truthmakers for various truths. However, Armstrong’s system insufficiently addresses the problem of truthmakers for existential truths. Armstrong argues that the truthmakers for existential truths are the relevant individuals rather than states of affairs. This paper contends that, given Armstrong’s commitments to Necessitarianism and the Entailment Principle, combined with the distinction between thin particulars and thick particulars, significant inconsistencies arise. If individuals are understood as thin particulars, they fail to satisfy these two principles when serving as truthmakers for existential truths. In contrast, states of affairs and thick particulars—which inherently include properties—can fulfill both principles. Consequently, states of affairs emerge as more appropriate truthmakers for these existential truths.