回收商回收模式转型演化分析
Analysis of the Evolutionary Transformation of Recyclers’ Recycling Models
DOI: 10.12677/mos.2025.144360, PDF,    国家自然科学基金支持
作者: 张祯祺:上海理工大学管理学院,上海
关键词: 电池回收演化博弈转型政府补贴Battery Recycling Evolutionary Game Theory Transformation Government Subsidies
摘要: 本文研究了新能源汽车废旧动力电池回收过程中,回收商在正规与非正规回收模式之间的策略选择及其演化路径。通过构建政府、回收商和居民三方演化博弈模型,分析了各参与主体的决策行为及其影响因素。研究发现,政府与居民的监督意愿对回收商选择正规回收模式具有显著影响,尤其是居民的监督效果更为明显。此外,提高回收商正规回收的收益能够有效促使其转向正规回收,而降低不正规回收的收益则只能减缓其转向非正规回收的速度。基于此,本文建议政府应鼓励回收商进行技术升级,并通过补贴政策支持其转型,同时构建居民监督平台,以促进废旧动力电池的可持续回收。
Abstract: This paper investigates the strategic choices and evolutionary paths of recyclers between formal and informal recycling modes in the process of recycling used power batteries from new energy vehicles. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, recyclers, and residents, the decision-making behaviors of each participant and their influencing factors are analyzed. The study finds that the willingness of the government and residents to supervise significantly influences recyclers’ choice of formal recycling modes, with the supervision effect of residents being particularly pronounced. Additionally, increasing the profits from formal recycling can effectively encourage recyclers to switch to formal recycling, while reducing the profits from informal recycling can only slow down their shift towards informal recycling. Based on these findings, the paper recommends that the government should encourage recyclers to upgrade their technologies and support their transition through subsidy policies, while also establishing resident supervision platforms to promote the sustainable recycling of used power batteries.
文章引用:张祯祺. 回收商回收模式转型演化分析[J]. 建模与仿真, 2025, 14(4): 1134-1143. https://doi.org/10.12677/mos.2025.144360

参考文献

[1] 张英杰, 许斌, 梁风, 等. 废旧磷酸铁锂电池正极材料的回收研究现状[J]. 人工晶体学报, 2019, 48(5): 800-808.
[2] 张淑英, 李天钰. 中国新能源汽车废旧动力电池报废量预测与对策建议——基于蒙特卡洛模拟的测算[J]. 环境与可持续发展, 2019, 44(6): 101-105.
[3] 王文宾, 刘业, 钟罗升, 戚金钰, 仝鹏. 补贴-惩罚政策下废旧动力电池的回收决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(11): 90-102.
[4] 谢家平, 李璟, 杨非凡, 梁玲. 新能源汽车闭环供应链的多级契约决策优化[J]. 管理工程学报, 2020, 34(2): 180-193.
[5] 何天慧. 政府监管下动力电池梯次利用闭环供应链三方演化博弈分析[J]. 辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版), 2024, 26(3): 184-191.
[6] Lu, J.Z. (2023) New Energy Subsidies, Green Innovation, and State-Owned Enterprise Shareholding Reform:A Study Based on Oligopoly Competition Model. Journal of Global Economy, Business and Finance, 5, 71-74.
[7] 徐耀群, 许楠, 郑艺. 基于演化博弈的动力电池逆向供应链技术创新研究[J]. 哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版), 2023(1): 101-116+128.
[8] 陈宇科, 童欣. 政府补贴对动力电池再生利用技术创新的激励效应[J]. 重庆师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2024, 41(4): 68-83.
[9] 许礼刚, 刘荣福, 陈磊, 倪俊. 前景理论视角下废旧动力电池回收监管演化博弈分析[J]. 重庆理工大学学报(自然科学), 2024, 38(1): 290-297.