基于序贯博弈的第三方漏洞共享平台信息安全漏洞披露策略分析

Analysis of Information Security Vulnerabilities Disclosure Strategy for Third Party Vulnerability Sharing Platform Based on Sequential Game Theory

摘要: 全球网络威胁日趋严峻，作为网络安全事件产生的根源之一，信息安全漏洞逐渐成为各国网络空间安全战略的重要内容，对信息安全漏洞的披露已是国家网络安全应急体系建设的重要内容之一。本文运用序贯博弈理论深入剖析信息安全漏洞披露中软件供应商、第三方漏洞共享平台、黑客及用户间的漏洞披露策略，揭示各方在不同情境下的最优策略，明晰信息不对称、成本收益等因素对决策的影响。研究发现，软件供应商在权衡成本与声誉损失后决策补丁披露；平台依据信息优势与收益决定漏洞公开；黑客基于入侵成功率和收益实施攻击；用户依据漏洞风险评估选择是否修复。本文为优化漏洞披露机制、提升信息安全管理水平提供理论支撑，对完善信息安全治理体系意义重大。

Abstract: Global cyber threats are becoming increasingly severe, as one of the root causes of network security incidents, information security vulnerabilities have gradually become an important part of Cyberspace Security Strategies in various countries. Disclosing information security vulnerabilities has become an important part of national network security emergency system construction. This paper uses sequential game theory to analyze the vulnerability disclosure strategies among software vendors, third-party vulnerability sharing platforms, hackers and users, to reveal the optimal strategies of each party in different situations, and to clarify the impact of information asymmetry, cost-benefit and other factors on decision-making. The results show that software vendors decide whether to disclose patches by weighing development costs against potential reputation losses; platforms determine whether to publicly disclose vulnerabilities based on their informational advantages and expected returns; hackers launch attacks by assessing the success rate of intrusions and potential gains; and users choose whether to apply fixes based on risk assessments of vulnerabilities. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for optimizing vulnerability disclosure mechanisms and enhancing information security management, and it holds significant implications for improving the overall information security governance system.